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P A U L A A. MO N O P O L I

Marriage, Property and [In]Equality: Remedying
ERISA’s Disparate Impact on Spousal Wealth
Congress is considering pension reform in the wake of the tremendous loss
in market value of retirement plans during the current recession. This offers a
historic moment to remedy an unintended but profound gender disparity
embedded in the federal law governing retirement plans in this country.
The common perception is that contemporary law and policy aim to
facilitate equality within marriage, including in the area of property ownership.
For example, the law has embraced equitable distribution in reallocating
property upon divorce.1 Equitable distribution is grounded in a joint
partnership theory of marriage that recognizes the contributions of both
spouses, whether or not purely monetary. However, the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act’s (ERISA) structuring of retirement asset
accumulation runs counter to this trend and in fact incentivizes the
concentration of wealth in the hands of husbands rather than wives within
intact marriages.2
There has been a movement over the past thirty years to transfer traditional
pension obligations from employers to employees 3 through the use of a tax-
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AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 4.09 cmt. b
(2008) (noting that “equitable distribution is the dominant rule” in the great majority of
states).
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829.
Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic Differences and
Trends, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF, Oct. 2004, at 1 (“[T]he number of private
sector workers covered by a DB [defined benefit] plan decreased from 30.1 million in 1980
to 22.6 million in 1999 (a decline of about 25 percent) while those covered by a DC [defined
contribution] plan increased from 14.4 million in 1980 to 46.9 million in 1999 (an increase
of
225
percent
over
the
same
period).”),
available
at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10-2004.pdf.
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preferred vehicle known as a “defined contribution” plan.4 The most widelyknown defined contribution plan is the 401(k),5 in which employees make pretax contributions and accrue savings tax-deferred. Americans are induced to
use defined contribution plans as their primary savings vehicle for a number of
reasons, including these significant tax incentives, the fact that many
employers match contributions, and the protection against creditors offered by
ERISA. As a result, Americans now hold $3.5 trillion in such plans.6
ERISA provides that employees may not assign or alienate their interest in
a defined contribution plan.7 The underlying policy rationale of this provision
is to “protect an employee from his own financial improvidence” with respect
to retirement accumulations.8 This “spendthrift” provision effectively
precludes a married couple from holding such defined contribution plans in
joint names, resulting in a concentration of wealth in the hands of the spouse –
typically the husband – that is more consistently in the labor market.9 Thus, as

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

62

See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451 (2004); see also
Alicia H. Munnell et al., Why Are Healthy Employers Freezing Their Pensions?, CENTER FOR
RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C. ISSUE IN BRIEF, Mar. 2006, at 1, available at
http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Briefs/ib_44.pdf (noting that reasons for employers to turn
from defined benefit to defined contribution plans include: reducing total compensation to
increase competitiveness in global markets, offsetting the increasing costs of health care, and
limiting market risk and regulatory costs).
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(k) (West Supp. 2009).
See Investment Company Institute, The U.S. Retirement Market, 2008, 18 RES.
FUNDAMENTALS, June 2009, at 2 fig.1, available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/fm-v18n5.pdf
(listing statistics for December 2008). The figure at the end of 2007 was $4.5 trillion, before
the market crashed. Id.
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(13) (West Supp. 2009).
Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1463 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118,
124 (2d Cir. 1979)).
See LESLIE E. PAPKE ET AL., THE RETIREMENT SECURITY PROJECT, RETIREMENT SECURITY FOR
WOMEN: PROGRESS TO DATE AND POLICIES FOR TOMORROW 4 (2008), available at
http://www.retirementsecurityproject.org/pubs/File/RSPPB_Women_FINAL_4.2.2008.pdf (“[W]omen near retirement are 5 percentage points less
likely than men to have a pension or a retirement plan (such as a 401(k) and IRA). Women
also have lower retirement assets than their male counterparts: the median female worker
near retirement held $34,000 in a 401(k) plan or IRA whereas her male counterpart held
$70,000.”); see also Alicia H. Munnell, Why Are So Many Older Women Poor?, CENTER FOR
RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C., JUST THE FACTS, Apr. 2004, available at
http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Just%20the%20Facts/jtf_10.pdf?phpMyAdmin=43ac483c4
de9t51d9eb41 (“Women have low lifetime earnings compared to men for three reasons . . . .
First, they have lower wages. Even women who are employed full-time earn about 25
percent less than men. Second, they are more likely to work part-time, which reduces their
hourly wage as well as their hours worked. About one quarter of all women work part-time,
compared to about 10 percent of men, and are most likely to work part-time when they have
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defined contribution plans become an increasingly significant percentage of
household wealth, husbands have concomitantly larger shares of the family
wealth held in their names alone.
Why does facilitating an equal allocation of retirement plan balances matter
in intact marriages? First, the law has an expressive dimension and it should
value caregiving and equality as a matter of fairness and justice. Money equals
power within a relationship and power asymmetry yields inequality.10
Encouraging a disproportionate accumulation of assets by the husband, even if
unintended as a policy matter, signals that the spouse – typically the wife –
who provides the bulk of the family caregiving makes a less valuable
contribution.
Second, limiting the ownership of defined contribution plans to a single
spouse subjects the other spouse to greater risk in terms of the overall family
wealth. Consider the following example. A husband has a much larger balance
in his 401(k) than his wife has in hers due to his uninterrupted employment
history. The husband is very tolerant of the market risk involved in investing in
stock and his entire portfolio is so invested.11 Assume that he has used his
401(k) as the primary family savings vehicle, given its favorable tax status, and
it constitutes a significant percentage of the family’s overall wealth. Federal
retirement and tax policy has effectively concentrated the power to control the
family’s financial future in the hands of one spouse. While there are some
restrictions on the husband’s ability to control distribution of the defined
contribution plan without his wife’s consent under ERISA,12 these are thin
“protections” for the wife if the money has been lost in a market crash.
Even if the couple were to agree to equalize ownership of the family assets
by transferring some of the husband’s assets to the wife’s 401(k) (or to an
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young children at home. Finally, women spend fewer years in the labor force. The typical
woman is in the work force 32 years, compared to 44 years for the typical man.”).
For an analysis of the expressive dimension of money within intact marriages, see Alicia
Brokars Kelly, Money Matters in Marriage: Unmasking Interdependence in Ongoing Spousal
Economic Relations, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 113 (2008).
See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Gender and Capital Gains Taxation (June 25, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1425664 (“Empirical
evidence suggests that attitudes and behaviors regarding financial decisions—including
capital gains—are gendered. Women, for example, being more risk averse than men, may
have fewer capital gains because they invest in fewer risky assets, which are the type of assets
that produce the biggest capital gains.”).
See MICHAEL J. CANAN, 1 QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS § 7:59, at 608 (2008) (“Plans not
otherwise required to provide a [qualified pre-retirement annuity for the surviving spouse]
because they are not subject to [Internal Revenue Code] § 412 must require that a married
participant’s balance (if not distributed prior to death) will be paid to the surviving spouse,
unless waived by the spouse.”).

63

the yale law journal online

119:61

2009

Individual Retirement Account if she does not have a 401(k)), the husband
could not do so without triggering a taxable event and causing both income
taxation of the amounts withdrawn as well as the additional ten percent tax
penalty associated with early withdrawals.13
Contemporary family law presumes an equal division of property upon
divorce, premised on a partnership theory of marriage that gives value to nonfinancial contributions like caregiving. In fact, ERISA provides a mechanism,
the court-ordered qualified domestic relations order or “QDRO,” to implement
an equal division of retirement assets without tax penalty in legal proceedings
like divorce.14 In essence, QDROs are an exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation
provision. However, QDROs are not readily available to couples in intact
marriages, which do not typically involve ongoing legal proceedings to
determine the property rights of the spouses.
In order to remedy this inconsistency and facilitate equality within intact
marriages, Congress should amend ERISA to confer an immediate ownership
interest in one-half of the assets in each spouse as they are earned and
contributed by one spouse. Second, each half should then be allocated to a
separate account, one in the husband’s name and one in the wife’s name.15
While this second step may be somewhat inconsistent with the view of
marriage as a partnership, it minimizes the risk that one spouse will dominate
investment decisions with regard to the assets. In the alternative, ERISA
should at least provide that each spouse’s defined contribution plan be held in a
joint account as a default rule.16
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26 U.S.C.A. § 72(t) (West Supp. 2009) (requiring ten percent additional tax to be paid and
listing exceptions (which do not include interspousal transfers) to the penalty). In addition,
the wife would be limited in terms of how much of that transfer from her husband she could
add to her own defined contribution plan. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 402(g)(1)(B) (West Supp.
2009) (limiting the annual contribution by a participant to $15,000 as of 2006).
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(13)(B) (2008); § 414(p) (West Supp. 2009).
If the wife (or husband) were not working and thus not eligible for a defined contribution
plan, this author’s proposal would provide that a defined contribution plan be set up for her
to hold her accumulation, akin to a “spousal IRA” for non-working spouses under current
law.
While defined contribution plans are governed by federal law, marital property is generally
governed by state law. ERISA has been found to preempt state law, even in areas like
inheritance, property, and family law that are traditionally reserved to the states. See
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997). This author’s
proposal would admittedly introduce a significant change to the theory underlying property
law regimes in separate property states. In those states, income is owned by the person who
earns it and holds title to it until voluntarily shared with a spouse via deposit in a joint bank
account, for example. This proposal would confer ownership of one-half of the assets upon
contribution on the non-employee spouse, more akin to a community property theory
which also confers an ownership interest on the non-earning spouse as soon as assets are
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A less fundamental but equally important additional reform would be to
allow married couples to equalize ownership by transferring unlimited
amounts between their accounts without triggering income taxation and the
ten percent early withdrawal penalty. This would be akin to the existing
unlimited marital deduction as applied to transfers under the current federal
gift tax.17
With these amendments, Congress could align federal pension law with the
overall movement toward gender equality in marital property law.
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accumulated during marriage. This author will explore these issues and the testamentary
implications of this proposal in a future paper.
26 U.S.C.A. § 2523 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009).
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